This paper investigates the conditions that may auger a reversal of China's increasingly unequal levels of regional industrial productivity during China's first two decades of economic reform. Using international and Chinese firm and industry data over the period 1995-2004, we estimate a productivity growth-technology gap reaction function. We find that as China's coastal industry has closed the technology gap with the international frontier relative to interior regions, labor productivity growth in the coastal region has begun to slow in relation to the interior. This may serve as an early indicator of China's initial movement toward reversing the widespread income inequality.
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I. Introduction
During much of the first two decades of China's economic reforms beginning in 1980, levels of industrial productivity across regions became increasingly unequal with the advantage accruing to the coastal provinces that captured most of the surge in foreign direct investment and led the way in enterprise restructuring. However, recent research has shown a tendency for industrial productivity levels across China's regions to converge. This paper investigates the underlying conditions that may be driving a spatial convergence of productivity levels within China. The paper specifically investigates the importance of the technology gap between industrial productivity in different industries and provinces and the international frontier as defined by counterpart U.S. industries. Under Gerchenkrone's thesis of the "advantages of backwardness," 1 we might expect China's interior industries over time to close the efficiency gap with their counterpart coastal industries. Our findings provide support for this expectation.
This paper adopts elements of the empirical research strategy used by Jefferson, Hu, and Su (2006, JHS for short hereafter) . However, to test our hypothesis, we employ a substantially different data set. We support our argument with empirical evidence using industry-province level data. Our empirical analysis includes 14 major industrial branches in 31 provinces and municipalities (including autonomous regions) from 1995 to 2004. The industrial branch data was constructed by regrouping the SIC 2-digit industry level data for each of China's 31 provinces. We use the set of industry-province 3 observations to estimate how the initial productivity gap with the international frontier affects future labor productivity growth. Unlike previous work, we also employ constant price and PPP-adjusted data to test how the hypothesis holds up when we control for price and exchange rate differences across the Chinese and U.S. economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we provide an overview of the patterns of industrial productivity growth across China's main regions. In sections 3 and 4, we first outline our regression model and then describe the data used for its estimation. Section 5 presents our empirical results. The final section presents our conclusions.
II. Overview of China's Productivity Growth
Based on China's industrial large and medium-size enterprises (LMEs), this section compares the level and growth of China's industrial labor productivity across different regions. 2 In Table 1 , panel 3, we show China's industrial labor productivity and growth rate by region, measured in current Yuan, from 1995 Yuan, from to 2004 . First, the table shows that large disparities exist in levels of productivity across regions, with the coastal region positioned well ahead of other regions. For example, in 1995, industrial labor productivity in the coastal region is around 32,150 Yuan per employee-year, compared to 17,730 Yuan per employee-year in the western region, a ratio of 2.15:1. That is, labor productivity in the west is only about 46 percent of the east (see Table 2 for more details).
This gap, however, declines in subsequent years. (again refer to Table 2 for details).
As implied by the above inter-temporal comparisons, the interior regions have enjoyed much faster rates of productivity growth than the coastal region. For example, in constant Yuan terms, from 1995 to 2004, the central region experienced a staggering 379 percent increase in its labor productivity, while the growth in the coastal region was much slower, at 273 percent, or two-thirds of the growth rate in the central region. In Table 1 , we also report levels and rates of growth of productivity in constant prices and purchasing power parity; the results are qualitatively unchanged relative to the picture we see for current Yuan measures. In general, during the 1995-2004 period, among all four regions, the northeastern region grew the fastest; it was followed by the western region and central region. In relation to labor productivity growth, the coastal region lagged the other three regions. These results are robust for all three productivity measures: current prices, constant prices, and PPP measures.
III. The Estimation Model
Our basic model, shown in Equation (1) below is similar to that developed by JHS (2006).
However, the data employed and econometric implementation of the two versions exhibit substantial differences. We explain these below.
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The variables in equation (1) Chinese industries and the international frontier, with the productivity level of the corresponding US industry serving as the proxy. The gap with the frontier is the initial gap at the beginning year, 1995.
We expect the coefficient of the initial productivity gap, or 1  , to be positive.
Our hypothesis is that consistent with the "advantages of backwardness" posited by Gershenkron (1962) . Chinese industries with productivity levels farther from the international frontier will exhibit relatively faster productivity growth rates in subsequent years than those with smaller productivity gaps. A central implication of this hypothesis is that these differences in productivity growth across different industry-provinces tend to converge over time. Why do we focus our productivity gap measure on the international frontier? Why do we not conduct the same analysis within China, using the Chinese industries that define China's national industrial technology frontier? There are several reasons.
First, from the analytical perspective, our approach of expressing the initial productivity gap with respect to the international frontier enables us to conduct analysis in international perspective. As our analysis focuses on "the advantages of backwardness" we need to make a judgment regarding the relative backwardness of were to measure the productivity gap between China's coastal region and interior regions, we would lose the observations in our regression analysis pertaining to the distances between the coastal industries and the international frontier; such a potential loss of coastal observations will render impossible an analysis on the productivity responses of coastal industries to the frontier productivity gap.
In addition to the linear frontier gap measure represented by the coefficient α 1 shown in Equation (1), we posit that the relationship between the gap and the rate of productivity growth may be non-linear. In order to model and estimate the possible nonlinearity of the relationship between the frontier gap and the rate of productivity growth, we include a quadratic version of the gap. A negative estimate of α 3 would show that the relationship is concave, that is, increases in the magnitude of the frontier gap exert positive but diminishing effects on the growth of labor productivity. A positive estimate would imply that rates of productivity growth increase proportionately greater than increases in the magnitude of the gap.
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Another main variable we include in our regression is the growth of frontier productivity itself. As productivity at the frontier is constantly moving, this variable serves as a control variable and will be useful in our analysis of international productivity Our model also includes a set of interactive terms between the productivity gap and the regional dummies. These are intended to capture any regional observations that substantially deviate from the productivity reaction function that best fits the overall pattern of data.
Compared with the JHS (2006) paper, we employ a significantly different data set and different econometric methods to estimate Equation (1) above. One notable difference is that the variable GAP_Front, or the initial productivity gap with the international frontier, was derived using industry-level PPPs, instead of a uniform market exchange rate. The common argument for using PPPs versus market exchange rate is that the former can avoid large fluctuations or volatilities in market exchange rates due to, for example, short term international capital flows, which tends to greatly distort international productivity comparisons. Since China's official exchange rate remained almost unchanged during 1995-2004, the volatility in the current market was not our 8 major concern. However, under China's fixed exchange rate system, the government set the official exchange rate very arbitrarily. The official exchange rate was fixed at about 8.27 Yuan per US Dollar during 1995 Dollar during -2004 . This non-market rates was unable to reflect the relative price and productivity changes between the two countries and tends to distort
Yuan-based measures of China's real productivity growth. In addition, when it comes to which PPP exchange rate to use in international productivity comparisons, there is a strong case to be made for using industry-level PPPs (also called industry-of-origin PPPs)
over the regular PPP measure and the official exchange rate. Advantages of the PPP approach are well documented in Maddison and Van Ark (1988) and Van Ark (1993) . In a nutshell, industry-of-origin PPPs better capture the industry-specific dynamics, including market structure, technological changes, which are unique to the industry, and it makes industry-specific performance comparisons across countries possible and more accurate.
A second difference with the JHS approach is that this paper focuses on the 14 major branches of China's manufacturing industry. The main reason for using 14 industrial branches versus more detailed 2-digit industry classifications as in JHS (2006) is that the ex-factory price index at the 2-digit industry level is only available from 2003.
But the index for the 14 major industrial branches can be traced back all the way to 1980.
Since ex-factory price is vital in deriving our industry-of-origin PPPs, we decided to map our more detailed 2-digit industries in LME database into the 14 major industrial branches.
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IV. Data
In this section, we describe our datasets and the methods used to calculate the variables in our regression analysis. We use two main datasets in our empirical work. The first dataset is the Large and Medium Enterprises database (LME) from China's National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS). This is a rich firm-level dataset that, on average, includes around 20,000 firms per year, from 1995 to 2004. According to our calculation, during these years this LME dataset covers approximately 60 percent of China's total industrial output. 3 We drive all industry-province-level variables from the aggregation of the firmlevel variables within the LME dataset.
The second dataset is drawn from the European Union's (EU) KLEMS database.
The EU-KLEMS database is an improved version of the previous 60-industry Database
for international productivity comparison hosted at the University of Groningen. 4 This dataset includes measures of labor productivity at the industry level for all EU countries and the U.S. Using our self-constructed industry-level PPPs between China and the U.S.,
we establish a link between industry-level productivities in China and the EU-KLEMS dataset. The method we use to construct these PPP measures is described in Appendix C.
Through this linkage we can easily expand our research scope in the future to include more countries, making it possible to undertake international comparisons of productivities at the industry-level between China and other countries. China's fixed exchange rate system greatly distorts China's relative level of productivity when compared to that of the U.S -the principal reason for using a different exchange rate to convert China's labor productivity into U.S. dollar equivalents. As shown in average. For example, the PPP for coal industry is 11.63, petroleum stands at 15.42 and the power industry is 15.9. The higher the value in our production-approach PPP means, the higher relative production cost per unit in that industry, indicating these industries are relatively less cost-efficient.
With industry-level PPPs in hand, we convert China's industrial productivities into U.S. dollars and compare China's productivity level with the international frontier. percent. In 2004, the coastal region still had higher comparative productivity, 18 percent of the U.S. level, but the interior regions had narrowed the gap significantly, with the west rising to 13 percent and the central region to 11 percent of the U.S. level.
In Table 5 
V. Empirical Results
In this section, we present and analyze our main regression results. Table 6 presents the summary statistics of the major variables used in the regression. The average growth rate of productivity growth among all industry-province observations was 152 percent over the 1995-2004 period; the average growth rate of capital-labor ratio over the same period was 106 percent. Our main independent variables, log of initial productivity gap in 1995, averaged 11, for which the anti-log conversion corresponds to 79,000 USD per employee-year. Table 7 presents the regression results of equation (1) using the PPP data set.
Column (1) shows the basic results from the simple regression of labor productivity growth of industry-province observation from 1995-2004 on the initial productivity gap between the industry-province and the international frontier, or Gap_Front i,j, 1995. Column (2)-(4) include more variables. As reported in the table, the coefficient on the initial productivity gap is highly significant and positive as expected, and it remains so throughout Columns (1) to (4). These results render strong support for our hypothesis that the larger the initial productivity gap with the international frontier, the faster the subsequent productivity growth.
The coefficient on the square of the initial productivity gap to the frontier, as shown in Columns (3) and (4), is negative and statistically significant. The negative sign indicates the second derivative of labor productivity growth on the initial gap is negative, suggesting that as the productivity gap increases, the rate at which labor productivity 13 increases slows. This is consistent with the general economic theory of the law of diminishing returns.
The coefficient on the growth of frontier productivity, as shown in Column (4), is positive and significant. This may well indicate, at least in China's case, the faster the international technological frontier advances, the faster the productivity growth for the respective industry in China. Given China's degree of openness to foreign direct investment and international trade, this result is not surprising.
With the exception of the coastal region, the coefficients on the interactive terms are statistically insignificant and therefore not reported. That the estimates for the coastal term are negative indicates that over our sample period, given the same productivity gap with the frontier, the coastal industries tend to grow slower than the industries in the interior regions. We will test to see if the negative sign remains in our later model configurations.
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To test the extent to which the results shown in Table 7 are sensitive to the choice of value measure, we redo the estimates using all three of the data sets. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 duplicate the regression results using the default industry-PPP approach as shown in Table 7 ; Columns (3) and (4) present the estimation results with industrial productivities of China converted into U.S. dollar values using the official exchange rate and the Yuan terms adjusted from current prices to constant 1997 prices; Finally, Columns (5) and (6) present the results with Chinese industry productivities converted to U.S. dollars using the official exchange rate, but without adjusting for constant prices.
The comparisons shown in Table 8 show that the results using the three different data sets 6 The coefficient on the interactive terms become not statistically significant when we test our model in a more robust panel data setting. See Table 5 -4 for more details.
14 are similar, thus demonstrating the robustness of our empirical results. The most noticeable inconsistency is that the constant price data concentrate their gap response effect in the linear specification; adding the quadratic terms diminishes the robustness of the estimate of the linear term. By comparison, estimates using the current data set generate the most robust results when both the linear and quadratic gap variables are included.
In order to test the robustness of our results reported above from another perspective, we split the ten-year period from 1995 to 2004 into two separate periods, 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 , and stack (pool) them to reestimate Equation (1). By adjusting the length of the time period from ten years in equation (1) to five years, the number of observations doubles.
The results for this new cut at the data are shown in Table 9 . In Columns (1) through (3), the signs and robustness of the estimates for the gap coefficients remain unchanged as do those for the growth of frontier productivity. The most notable change is that the estimates of the interactive coastal term become statistically insignificant, although the sign still remains negative. Unlike the other estimates, the robustness of the coastal terms appears to depend on the time horizon of the observations used to estimate Equation (1).
One issue that arises from scrutiny of Equation (1) is the possibility of an omitted variables problem. Specifically, this question arises if we view the estimation equation as having been derived as a rate-of-change version of an intensive production function.
Equation (1) shows labor productivity growth as a function of the technology gap only.
Within a production function context, however, we would expect output per capita in the 15 intensive form of the production function to be driven not only by overall productivity or TFP but also to be driven by the capital-labor ratio, i.e. by capital deepening.
What is the justification for omitting in Equation (1) the rate of growth of the capital-labor ratio as an argument for determining the rate of productivity growth?
Including the growth of the capital-labor ratio raises the question of the factors that drive the rate of capital deepening. To the extent that over the longer term growth of the capital-labor ratio is driven by the growth of TFP, inclusion of the capital-labor ratio will create potential problems of included variables misspecification and endogeneity. This argument that the growth of the capital-labor ratio should be omitted from our estimation equation is more formally presented in Appendix A.
Notwithstanding our perspective that including the growth of the capital-labor ratio in Equation (1) would cause Equation (1) to be misspecified, in Table 8 , Column (5),
we test a specification of the productivity response function that incorporates the growth of the capital-labor ratio. 7 As suggested above, we would expect that the growth of the capital-labor ratio would be highly correlated with the international productivity gap and with the dependent variable, the growth of the output per worker. Indeed, the results in
Column (5) show that the estimate of the coefficient on the growth of the capital-labor ratio is highly robust. At the same time, while the gap coefficients become somewhat smaller in magnitude and lose some of their statistical robustness, they nonetheless retain statistical significance, at better than the 5 percent level for the linear measure of the gap and within the 10 percent level for the quadratic measure of the gap. Still, our view is 16 that inclusion of the growth of the capital-labor ratio constitutes a misspecification of the productivity growth dynamic that this paper is attempting to represent and test.
VI. Concluding Remarks
We present empirical evidence that China has been experiencing a convergence in labor productivity across different regions. The purpose of this paper is to explain the dynamics that are driving this convergence. Over our sample period, productivity in the more advanced coastal region has tended to grow slower while labor productivity in other regions has tended to grow much faster.
Using three alternative measures of labor productivity -measured in terms of current price Yuan values, constant price Yuan values, and PPP U.S. dollar measureswe find robust evidence in support of the central hypothesis of this paper. That hypothesis is that the greater the distance between the level of labor productivity in a home industry located in a particular Chinese region and the level of labor productivity in the counterpart international frontier (U.S.) industry, the greater the subsequent productivity growth of the home Chinese industry.
This finding carries intriguing implications for evolving patterns of regional income inequality in China. China's coastal region pioneered the opening of China's economy to international trade and FDI, leading to a surge of investment, new enterprise entry, and restructuring in the coastal provinces. As China's playing field has been made more uniform over the past decade and a half, the interior regions have gained more access to trade and foreign capital as well as advanced technologies that have become absorbed by coastal industry, thus providing channels for China's interior regions to gain 17 more equal access to the industrial technologies that define the international technology frontier. As a result, we see that the advantages of backwardness have begun to assert themselves in favor of China's interior industrial enterprises.
The emerging growth patterns, such as those we document in this paper, may offer China a way out of the traditional inequality-growth tradeoff,; economic policies that encourage the faster growth in poorer regions may have the effect of reducing inequality and sustaining China's overall high growth rate simultaneously. We will welcome further research that investigates whether the dynamic process of China's productivity convergence that we document through the middle of the decade of the 2000s indeed continues into the present. 
Appendix A
In order to understand how inclusion of the growth of the capital-labor ratio might lead to included variables misspecification, we enlist the steady-state equation in Solow's neoclassical growth model, i.e. sq = (n+δ)k, where s is the savings rate, q is output per capita, n is the rate of population growth, δ is the rate of depreciation of the capital stock, and k is the capital-labor ratio. As a characterization of the steady-state capital ratio for a nation's economy, this expression is seemingly unrelated to the question at hand.
However, we re-interpret the expression as characterizing the steady-state capital-labor ratio of the firm in which s represents the rate of investment out of output per worker, n as the rate of growth of the firm's labor force, and δ is the rate of depreciation of the capital stock. Substituting q, the firm's intensive production function, i.e. q = Ak .
Taking the log form of this expression and differencing it to represent the rate of growth of the capital-labor ratio results in the cancellation of s, n and δ, assumed to be time-invariant variables, leaving the rate of growth of the firm's capital-labor ratio as a function of the differencing (or rate of growth) of the firm's productivity. With this interpretation, the capital-labor ratio would be redundant in Equation (1), where the growth of the firm's overall productivity is assumed to be driven by the distance to the relevant international productivity frontier.
